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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE CITY ERRONEOUSLY RELIES ON THE "COMMUNITY
CARETAKER AUTOMOBILE STOP" TEST IN ANALYZING THE
PROPRIETY OF OFFICER HEDENSTROM'S WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF
MR. DAVIDSON.
In its (Corrected) Brief of Appellee, the City argues that Officer Hedenstrom's
warrantless search may be upheld if he was acting in his capacity as a "community caretaker" and
exigent circumstances created an imminent danger to life or limb. In making this argument, the
City relies solely on the case of Provo City v. Warden. 844 P.2d 360 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), in
which this Court established a three tiered test for community caretaker automobile stops. The
City's reliance on Provo City is misplaced for several reasons.
First, the City assumes that the test set forth in Provo City applies equally to both
automobile stops and to other types of Fourth Amendment intrusions. However, the City fails to
recognize that Provo City and all the cases discussed therein relate to the propriety of minimally
intrusive automobile stops, not highly invasive personal searches like that conducted by Officer
Hedenstrom in this case. This distinction is significant and is highlighted by noting the
differences between the automobile stop upheld in Provo City and Officer Hedenstrom's search

of Mr. Davidson.
In Provo City, a police officer stopped the defendant's car after being told that the
defendant was looking for cocaine so he could "drive himself into a wall." Id at 361. The
officer testified and the trial court found that there was no reason to believe the defendant had
committed a crime at the time of the stop and that the only reason for the stop was a concern for
"this person's welfare and mental stability." Id at 361-62. However, after making contact with
the defendant, the officer noted that his breath smelled of alcohol and that he was unsteady on his
feet. The officer administered a standard battery of field sobriety tests and then arrested the
defendant for driving under the influence of alcohol. Id. at 361. This Court upheld the legality
of the initial stop and established the following test for valid community caretaker automobile
stops:
First, the trial court must determine if a seizure occurred under the Fourth
Amendment. Second, the court must determine whether the seizure was in pursuit
of a bona fide community caretaker function. Third, the court must ascertain
whether the circumstances were such that there was a reasonable belief that the
circumstances posed an imminent danger to life or limb.
Id at 366.
The primary distinction to be made between Provo City and the present case is that Provo
City is an "automobile stop" case, not a "search" case. Courts have routinely recognized that
automobile stops are far less intrusive than searches. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse 440 U.S. 648,
661 (1979) (intrusiveness of automobile stop is limited in magnitude compared to other
intrusions); U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976) (intrusiveness of automobile stop
and associated inquiry is minimal); compare State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994)
(police officer may effect traffic stop if there is reasonable suspicion of traffic or equipment
2

violation) with State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989) (n
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following traffic stop, officer may not search automobile unless there is probable cause for the
sea*

'
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- is reasonable suspicion that the suspect is potentially dangerous and the search

is limited to search for weapons). In contrast, the expectation that we will be free from a police
officer's probing fingers is both legitimate and substantial. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,17
(1968) (recognizing that ai I officer's search of a person "is a sen

•*•:.»

.

le sanctity

of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be
undertaken lightly."). In short, automobile stops are not subject to the same Fourth Amendment
constraints as other types of Fourth Amendment intrusions and llir sUind.ird under n hi>, h JH
automobile stop is evaluated is not the same as the standard governing police searches of
individuals.
Moreover, even ifProvo City's community caretaker rationale is expanded to eiicompass
searches of individuals, Officer Hedenstrom's search of Mr. Davidson cannot be justified as a
"community caretaker" search

Die secc iid requireim! -*

Provo City's community caretaker

test is that the officer's conduct must have been in pursuit of a bona fide community caretaker
function Provo City, 844 P.2d at 366. The Court defined community caretaking functions as
"'totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relath
violation of a criminal statute.'" kL at 363 n.l (quoting Cadv v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441
(1973) (emp: isis added)).1

1

In Provo City, the Court concluded that "[t]he officer was not acting within his duties
of detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the commission of crimes.
Therefore, we determine that the officer was acting within a bona fide community caretaker
function." 844 P.2d at 365.
3

In contrast, Judge Hutchings found that, in searching Mr. Davidson, Officer Hedenstrom
was acting partially as a law enforcer, not solely as a community caretaker: "[I]n his mind
[Officer Hedenstrom] had two bases; Obstruction of Justice which would have justified the
search; and exigent circumstances." R. 94. This finding was presumably drawn from Officer
Hedenstrom's testimony that he searched Mr. Davidson because "It's a standard procedure when
someone is arrested to search them for weapons and anything else. I was hoping to find the drug
paraphernalia that this man had overdosed on that could help him." R. 74. In other words,
Officer Hedenstrom searched Mr. Davidson for both community caretaking and law enforcement
purposes.2 Because Officer Hedenstrom's search was not "totally divorced from the detection,
investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute," it was not
in pursuit of a bona fide community caretaking function as required by Provo City.3
CONCLUSION
The City erroneously relies on Provo City's "community caretaker automobile stop" test

2

In its (Corrected) Brief of Appellee, the City states that "Judge Hutchings correctly
ruled that the officer had a primary motivation in determining what substance the person on the
table had ingested" and that Judge Hutchings "had plenty of facts to base this opinion on."
(Corrected) Brief of Appellee at 8. In fact, Judge Hutchings did not categorize Officer
Hedenstrom's conflicting motivations as primary or secondary, but simply held that because one
of the two reasons for the search was to help the unconscious man, the search was justified. R.
94. Moreover, the "facts" upon which the City contends Judge Hutchings based his opinion took
place during Officer Hedenstrom's initial questioning of Mr. Davidson, not during the
subsequent arrest and search.
3

The Court in Provo City recognized that some stops which are legitimate exercises of
police community caretaker responsibilities will, nonetheless, fail to pass the specific
requirements set forth in that case. The Court noted that such stops will "result in application of
the exclusionary rule, while still achieving the objectives of community caretaking. This appears
to be a legitimate means of encouraging genuine police caretaking functions while deterring
bogus or pretextual police activities." 844 P.2d at 365.
4

in analyzing the propriety of Officer Hedenstrom's warrantless search of Mr. Davidson. Instead,
this Court should evaluate Officer Hedenstrom's search with reference to the medical emergency
exception to the search warrant requirement, as described in Judge Greenwood's concurring
opinion in State v. Yoden 935 P.2d 534, 550 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (Greenwood, J. concurring).
Further, this Court should reject application of that exception to the facts of this case for the
reasons set forth in Mr. Davidson's Brief of Appellant.
SUBMITTED this *HU day of May, 1999.

DAVID S.KOT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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